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Abstract
We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections un-
der two classic fully proportional representation rules—Chamberlin–Courant’s rule and
Monroe’s rule. Winner determination for these rules is known to be NP-hard for unre-
stricted preferences. We show that for single-crossing preferences this problem admits
a polynomial-time algorithm for Chamberlin–Courant’s rule, but remains NP-hard for
Monroe’s rule. Our algorithm for Chamberlin–Courant’s rule can be modified to work
for elections with bounded single-crossing width. To circumvent the hardness result for
Monroe’s rule, we consider single-crossing elections that satisfy an additional constraint,
namely, ones where each candidate is ranked first by at least one voter (such elections
are called narcissistic). For single-crossing narcissistic elections, we provide an efficient
algorithm for the egalitarian version of Monroe’s rule.
1 Introduction
Parliamentary elections, i.e., procedures for selecting a fixed-size set of candidates that, in
some sense, best represent the voters, received a lot of attention in the literature. Some well-
known approaches include first-past-the-post system (FPTP), where the voters are divided
into districts and in each district a plurality election is held to find this district’s represen-
tative; party-list systems, where the voters vote for parties and later the parties distribute
the seats among their members; SNTV (single nontransferable vote) and Bloc rules, where
the voters cast t-approval ballots and the rule picks k candidates with the highest approval
scores (here k is the target parliament size, and t = 1 for SNTV and t = k for Bloc); and a
variant of STV (single transferable vote). In this paper, we focus on two voting rules that,
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for each voter, explicitly define the candidate that will represent her in the parliament (such
rules are said to provide fully proportional representation), namely, Chamberlin–Courant’s
rule [CC83] and Monroe’s rule [Mon95]. Besides parliamentary elections, the winner deter-
mination algorithms for these rules can also be used for other applications, such as resource
allocation [Mon95, SFS13b] and recommender systems [LB11].
Let us consider an election where we seek a k-member parliament chosen out of m
candidates by n voters. Both Chamberlin–Courant’s and Monroe’s rule work by finding a
function Φ that assigns to each voter v the candidate that is to represent v in the parlia-
ment. This function is required to assign at most k candidates altogether.1 Further, under
Monroe’s rule each candidate is either assigned to about n
k
voters or to none. The latter re-
striction does not apply to Chamberlin–Courant’s rule, where each selected candidate may
represent an arbitrary number of voters, and, as a consequence, the parliament elected in
this manner may have to use weighted voting in its proceedings. Finally, each voter should
be represented by a candidate that this voter ranks as high as possible.
To specify the last requirement formally, we assume that there is a global dissatisfaction
function α, α : N → N, such that α(i) is a voter’s dissatisfaction from being represented
by a candidate that she views as i-th best. (A typical example is Borda dissatisfaction
function αB given by αB(i) = i − 1.) In the utilitarian variants of Chamberlin–Courant’s
and Monroe’s rules we seek assignments that minimize the sum of voters’ dissatisfactions; in
the egalitarian variants (introduced recently by Betzler et al. [BSU13]) we seek assignments
that minimize the dissatisfaction of the worst-off voter.
Chamberlin–Courant’s and Monroe’s rules have a number of attractive properties, which
distinguish them from other multiwinner rules. Indeed, they elect parliaments that (at
least in some sense) proportionally represent the voters, ensure that candidates who are
not individually popular cannot make it to the parliament even if they come from very
popular parties, and take minority candidates into account. In contrast, FPTP can provide
largely disproportionate results, party-list systems cause members of parliament to feel more
responsible to the parties than to the voters, SNTV and Bloc tend to disregard minority
candidates, and STV is believed to put too much emphasis on voters’ top preferences.
Unfortunately, Chamberlin–Courant’s and Monroe’s rules do have one flaw that makes
them impractical: It is NP-hard to compute their winners [PRZ08, LB11, BSU13]. Nonethe-
less, these rules are so attractive that there is a growing body of research on computing their
winners exactly (e.g., through integer linear programming formulations [PB98], by means
of fixed-parameter tractability analysis [BSU13], by considering restricted preference do-
mains [BSU13, YCE13]) and approximately [LB11, SFS13b, SFS13a]. We continue this line
of research by considering the complexity of finding exact Chamberlin–Courant and Monroe
winners for the case where voters’ preferences are single-crossing. Our results complement
those of Betzler et al. [BSU13] for single-peaked electorates.
1Under Monroe’s rule we are required to pick exactly k winners. Some authors also impose this
requirement in the case of Chamberlin–Courant’s rule, but allowing for smaller parliaments appears
to be more consistent with the spirit of this rule and is standard in its computational analysis (see,
e.g., [LB11, BSU13, SFS13b, SFS13a, YCE13]). In any case, this distinction has no bite if there are at
least k candidates that are ranked first by some voter, which is usually the case in political elections.
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Recall that voters are said to have single-crossing preferences if it is possible to order
them so that for every pair of candidates a, b the voters who prefer a to b form a consecutive
block on one side of the order and the voters who prefer b to a form a consecutive block
on the other side. For example, it is quite natural to assume that the voters are aligned on
the standard political left-right axis. Given two candidates a and b, where a is viewed as
more left-wing and b is viewed as more right-wing, the left-leaning voters would prefer a to
b and the right-leaning voters would prefer b to a. While real-life elections are typically too
noisy to have this property, it is plausible that they may be close to single-crossing, and
it is important to understand the complexity of the idealized model before proceeding to
study nearly single-crossing profiles (in the context of single-peaked elections this agenda
has been successfully pursued by Faliszewski et al. [FHH11]).
Our main results are as follows: for single-crossing elections winner determination under
Chamberlin–Courant’s rule is in P (for every dissatisfaction function, and both for the
utilitarian and for the egalitarian version of this rule), but under Monroe’s rule it is NP-
hard. Our hardness result for Monroe’s rule applies to the utilitarian setting with Borda
dissatisfaction function. Our algorithm for Chamberlin–Courant’s rule extends to elections
that have bounded single-crossing width (see [CGS12, CGS13]). Our proof proceeds by
showing that for single-crossing elections Chamberlin–Courant’s rule admits an optimal
assignment that has the contiguous blocks property: the set of voters assigned to an elected
representative forms a contiguous block in the voters’ order witnessing that the election
is single-crossing. This property can be interpreted as saying that each selected candidate
represents a group of voters who are fairly similar to each other, and we believe it to be
desirable in the context of proportional representation.
The NP-hardness result for Monroe’s rule motivates us to search for further domain
restrictions that may make this problem tractable. To this end, we focus on the egalitarian
version of Monroe’s rule and, following the example of Cornaz et al. [CGS12], consider
elections that, in addition to being single-crossing, are narcissistic, i.e., have the property
that every candidate is ranked first by at least one voter. In parliamentary elections,
narcissistic profiles are very natural: we expect all candidates to vote for themselves. We
provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the egalitarian version of Monroe’s rule for all
elections that belong to this class. Our algorithm is based on the observation that for single-
crossing narcissistic elections under the egalitarian version of Monroe’s rule there is always
an optimal assignment that satisfies the contiguous blocks property. We show, however,
that this result does not extend to general single-crossing elections or to the utilitarian
version of Monroe’s rule: in both cases, requiring the contiguous blocks property may rule
out all optimal assignments.
In a sense, our result for single-crossing narcissistic elections is not new: it can be shown
that such elections are single-peaked (this result is implicit in the work of Barbera` and
Moreno [BM11]), and Betzler et al. [BSU13] provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the
egalitarian version of Monroe’s rule for single-peaked electorates. However, our algorithm
has two significant advantages over the one of Betzler et al.: First, it has considerably better
worst-case running time, and second, it produces assignments that have the contiguous
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blocks property. In contrast, if we formulate the analogue of the contiguous blocks property
for single-peaked elections, by considering the ordering of the voters that is induced by the
axis (see Section 5 for details), we can construct an election where no optimal assignment
has the contiguous blocks property; this holds both for Monroe’s rule and for Chamberlin–
Courant’s rule (and both for the egalitarian version and for the utilitarian version of either
rule).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide the required background,
give the definitions of Monroe’s and Chamberlin–Courant’s rules, and define single-crossing
and single-peaked elections. Then, in Sections 3 and 4, we discuss the complexity of winner
determination under Chamberlin–Courant’s and Monroe’s rules, respectively. We show the
limits of the contiguous blocks property approach in Section 5. We conclude the paper in
Section 6 by summarizing our results and discussing future research directions.
2 Preliminaries
For every positive integer s, we let [s] denote the set {1, . . . , s}. An election is a pair
E = (C, V ) where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates and V = (v1, . . . , vn) is an
ordered list of voters. Each voter v ∈ V has a preference order ≻v, i.e., a linear order over
C that ranks all the candidates from the most desirable one to the least desirable one. For
each voter v ∈ V and each candidate c ∈ C, we denote by posv(c) the position of c in v’s
preference order (the top candidate has position 1 and the last candidate has position |C|).
We refer to the list V as the preference profile.
Given an election E = (C, V ) and a subset of candidates D ⊂ C, we denote by V |D
the profile obtained by restricting the preference order of each voter in V to D. We denote
the concatenation of two voter lists U and V by U + V ; if U consists of a single vote u we
simply write u+ V . A list U is said to be a sublist of a list V (denoted by U ⊆ V ) if U can
be obtained from V by deleting voters. An election (C ′, V ′) is said to be a subelection of
an election (C, V ) if C ′ ⊆ C and V ′ = U |C′ for some U ⊆ V . Given a subset of candidates
A, we denote by A→ a fixed ordering of candidates in A and by A← the reverse of this
ordering. Given two disjoint sets A,B ⊂ C, we write · · · ≻ A ≻ B ≻ . . . to denote a vote
where all candidates in A are ranked above all candidates in B.
2.1 Chamberlin–Courant’s and Monroe’s Rules
Both Chamberlin–Courant’s rule and Monroe’s rule rely on the notion of a dissatisfaction
function (also known as a misrepresentation function). This function specifies, for each
i ∈ [m], a voter’s dissatisfaction from being represented by candidate she ranks in position i.
Definition 1 For an m-candidate election, a dissatisfaction function is a nondecreasing
function α : [m]→ N with α(1) = 0.
We will typically be interested in families of dissatisfaction functions, (αm)∞m=1, with one
function for each possible number of candidates. In particular, we will be interested in
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Borda dissatisfaction function αmB (i) = αB(i) = i − 1. We assume that our dissatisfaction
functions are computable in polynomial time with respect to m.
Let k be a positive integer. A k-CC-assignment function for an election E = (C, V ) is
a mapping Φ: V → C such that |Φ(V )| ≤ k. A k-Monroe-assignment function for E is a
k-CC-assignment function that additionally satisfies the following constraints: |Φ(V )| = k,
and for each c ∈ C either |Φ−1(c)| = 0 or ⌊n
k
⌋ ≤ |Φ−1(c)| ≤ ⌈n
k
⌉. That is, both assignment
functions select (up to) k candidates, and a k-Monroe-assignment function additionally
ensures that each selected candidate is assigned to roughly the same number of voters. For
a given assignment function Φ, we say that voter v ∈ V is represented (in the parliament)
by candidate Φ(v). There are several ways to measure the quality of an assignment function
Φ with respect to a dissatisfaction function α; we use the following two:
1. ℓ1(Φ) =
∑
i=1,...,n α(posvi(Φ(vi))), and
2. ℓ∞(Φ) = maxi=1,...,n α(posvi(Φ(vi))).
Intuitively, ℓ1(Φ) takes the utilitarian view of measuring the sum of voters’ dissatisfactions,
whereas ℓ∞ takes the egalitarian view of looking at the worst-off voter only.
We are now ready to define the voting rules that are the subject of this paper.
Definition 2 For every family of dissatisfaction functions α = (αm)∞m=1, every R ∈ {CC,
Monroe}, and every ℓ ∈ {ℓ1, ℓ∞}, an α-ℓ-R voting rule is a mapping that takes an election
E = (C, V ) and a positive integer k with k ≤ |C| as its input, and returns a k-R-assignment
function Φ for E that minimizes ℓ(Φ) (if there are several optimal assignments, the rule is
free to return any of them).
Chamberlin and Courant [CC83] and Monroe [Mon95] proposed the utilitarian variants
of their rules and focused on Borda dissatisfaction function (though Monroe also considered
so-called k-approval dissatisfaction functions). Egalitarian variants of both rules have been
recently introduced by Betzler et al. [BSU13].
2.2 Single-Crossing and Single-Peaked Profiles
The notion of single-crossing preferences dates back to the work of Mirrlees [Mir71]; we
also point the reader to the work of Saporiti and Tohme´ [ST06] for some settings where
single-crossing preferences are studied. Formally, such elections are defined as follows.
Definition 3 An election E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates and
V = (v1, . . . , vn) is an ordered list of voters, is single-crossing (with respect to the given
order of voters) if for each pair of candidates a, b such that a ≻v1 b, there exists a value
ta,b ∈ [n] such that {i ∈ [n] | a ≻vi b} = [ta,b].
That is, as we sweep through the list of voters from the first one towards the last one, the
relative order of every pair of candidates changes at most once.
Definition 3 refers to the ordering of the voters provided by V . Alternatively, one
could simply require existence of an ordering of the voters that satisfies the single-crossing
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property. The advantage of our approach is that it simplifies notation, yet does not affect
the complexity of the problems that we study: one can compute an order of the voters that
makes an election single-crossing (or decide that such an order does not exist) in polynomial
time [EFS12, BCW12].
We also consider single-peaked elections [Bla48].
Definition 4 Let ≻ be a preference order over candidate set C and let ✁ be an order over C.
We say that ≻ is single-peaked with respect to ✁ if for every triple of candidates a, b, c ∈ C
it holds that ((a ✁ b ✁ c) ∨ (c ✁ b ✁ a)) =⇒ (a ≻ b =⇒ b ≻ c). An election E = (C, V )
is single-peaked with respect to an order ✁ over C if the preference order of every voter
v ∈ V is single-peaked with respect to ✁. An election E = (C, V ) is single-peaked if there
exists an order ✁ over C with respect to which it is single-peaked.
If an election E is single-peaked with respect to some order ✁ then we call ✁ a societal
axis for E. There are polynomial-time algorithms that given an election E decide if it is
single-peaked and if so, compute a societal axis for it [BT86, ELO¨08]. Thus, just as in the
case of single-crossing elections, we can freely assume that if an election is single-peaked
then we are given a societal axis as well.
3 Chamberlin–Courant’s Rule
We start our discussion by considering the complexity of winner-determination under Cham-
berlin–Courant’s rule, for the case of single-crossing profiles.
3.1 Single-Crossing Profiles
A key observation in our analysis of Chamberlin–Courant’s rule is that for single-crossing
profiles there always exists an optimal k-CC-assignment function where the voters matched
to a given candidate form contiguous blocks within the voters’ order. In what follows, we
will say that assignments of this form have the contiguous blocks property. We believe that
this property is desirable from the social choice perspective: it means that voters who are
represented by the same candidate are quite similar, which makes it easier for the candidate
to act in a way that reflects the preferences of the group he represents. Later, we will see
that the contiguous blocks property also has useful algorithmic implications.
Lemma 5 Let E = (C, V ) be a single-crossing election, where C = {c1, . . . , cm}, V =
(v1, . . . , vn), and v1 has preference order c1 ≻ · · · ≻ cm. Then for every k ∈ [m], every
dissatisfaction function α for m candidates, and every ℓ ∈ {ℓ1, ℓ∞}, there is an optimal
k-CC assignment Φ for E under α-ℓ-CC such that for each candidate ci ∈ C, if Φ
−1(ci) 6= ∅
then there are two integers, ti and t
′
i, ti ≤ t
′
i, such that Φ
−1(ci) = {vti , vti+1, . . . , vt′i}.
Moreover, for each i < j such that Φ−1(ci) 6= ∅ and Φ
−1(cj) 6= ∅ it holds that t
′
i < tj .
Proof Fix a single-crossing election E = (C, V ) with C = {c1, . . . , cm} and V =
(v1, . . . , vn), and let Φ be an optimal k-CC-assignment function for E under α-ℓ-CC. We
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assume without loss of generality that for each voter vi in V , the candidate Φ(vi) is vi’s
most preferred candidate is Φ(V ). Let cj be v1’s least preferred candidate in Φ(V ). Now
consider some voter vi such that Φ(vi) = cj . We have Φ(vi′) = cj for every voter vi′ such
that i′ > i. Indeed, suppose for the sake of contradiction that Φ(vi′) = ck for k 6= j. By
our choice of cj we have ck ≻1 cj . On the other hand, we have cj ≻i ck and ck ≻i′ cj , a
contradiction with E being a single-crossing election. Hence, the voters that are matched
to cj by Φ form a consecutive block at the end of the preference profile.
To see that for each c ∈ Φ(V ) it holds that voters in Φ−1(c) form a consecutive block,
it suffices to delete cj and the voters that are matched to cj from the profile, decrease k by
one, and repeat the same argument. ✷
Lemma 5 suggests a dynamic programming algorithm for Chamberlin–Courant’s rule.
Theorem 6 For every family α of polynomial-time computable dissatisfaction functions
and for ℓ ∈ {ℓ1, ℓ∞}, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that given a single-crossing
election E and a positive integer k finds an optimal k-CC assignment for E under α-ℓ-CC.
Proof Let E = (C, V ) be our input single-crossing election, where C = {c1, . . . , cm},
V = (v1, . . . , vn) and v1 has preference order c1 ≻ · · · ≻ cm, and let k be the target
parliament size.
For every i ∈ {0} ∪ [n], j ∈ [m], and t ∈ [k] we define A[i, j, t] to be the optimal
ℓ-aggregated dissatisfaction that can be achieved with a t-CC-assignment function when
considering subelection (Cj , Vi), where Cj = {c1, . . . , cj} and Vi = (v1, . . . , vi) (clearly,
(Cj , Vi) is single-crossing). It is easy to see that for every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] \ {1} and
k ∈ [t]\{1} the following recursive relation holds (in the equation below, we abuse notation
and treat ℓ as the respective norm on real vectors, i.e., we assume that it maps a list of
values to their sum (when ℓ = ℓ1) or their maximum (when ℓ = ℓ∞)):
A[i, j, t] = min
{
A[i, j − 1, t],min
i∗<i
ℓ
(
A[i∗, j − 1, t− 1], α(posvi∗+1(cj)), . . . , α(posvi(cj))
)}
.
The idea of this recursive relation is to guess the first voter vi∗+1 to be represented by cj ;
the optimal representation of the preceding voters is found recursively, for assembly size
t − 1. To take care of the possibility that cj does not participate in the solution, we also
take A[i, j − 1, t] into account.
The base cases of the above recursion are as follows. For every j ∈ [m] and t ∈ [k], we
have A[0, j, t] = 0. For every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], it holds that
A[i, j, 1] = min
j′≤j
ℓ
(
α(posv1(cj′)), . . . , α(posvi(cj′))
)
.
For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], and t ≥ j, we have A[i, j, t] = 0 (we match each voter to her top
candidate). These conditions suffice for our recursion to be well-defined. Using dynamic
programming, we can compute in polynomial time (in fact, in time O(mn2k)) the optimal
dissatisfaction of the voters and a parliament that achieves it. ✷
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3.2 Extension to Profiles with Bounded Single-Crossing Width
Following the ideas of Cornaz, Galand, and Spanjaard [CGS12, CGS13], we can extend our
algorithm for Chamberlin–Courant’s rule to profiles with so-called bounded single-crossing
width.
Definition 7 A set D, D ⊆ C, is a clone set in an election E = (C, V ) if each voter in V
ranks the candidates from D consecutively (but not necessarily in the same order).
Definition 8 We say that an election E = (C, V ) has single-crossing width (respectively,
single-peaked width) at most w if there exists a partition of C into sets D1, . . . ,Dt such that
(a) for each i ∈ [t] the set Di is a clone set in E and |Di| ≤ w, and (b) if we contract each Di
in each vote to a single candidate di, then the resulting preference profile is single-crossing
(respectively, single-peaked).
Profiles with small single-crossing width may arise, e.g., in parliamentary elections where the
candidates are divided into (small) parties and the voters have single-crossing preferences
over the parties, but not necessarily over the candidates. Using the same techniques as
Cornaz et al., we obtain the following result.
Proposition 9 For every family α of polynomial-time computable dissatisfaction functions
and for every ℓ ∈ {ℓ1, ℓ∞}, there is an algorithm that given an election E = (C, V ) with
C = {c1, . . . , cm}, V = (v1, . . . , vn) whose single-crossing width is bounded by w, a partition
of C into clone sets that witnesses this width bound, and a positive integer k, finds an
optimal k-CC assignment for E under α-ℓ-CC, and runs in time poly(m,n, k, 2w).
Proof sketch Let E = (C, V ) be our input election, and let D1, . . . ,Ds be a partition
of C witnessing that the single-crossing width of E is at most w; assume that the order of
the sets D1, . . . ,Ds is such that the preference order of the first voter in V is of the form
D1 ≻ D2 ≻ · · · ≻ Ds. We first observe that Lemma 5 generalizes easily to elections with a
given partition into clone sets. Specifically, there exists an optimal k-CC assignment Φ for E
under α-ℓ-CC, where for each clone set Di, if Φ
−1(Di) 6= ∅ (that is, if at least one candidate
from Di is assigned to some voter) then: (a) there are two integers, ti and t
′
i, ti ≤ t
′
i, such
that Φ−1(Di) = {vti , vti+1, . . . , vt′i}, and (b) for each i < j such that Φ
−1(Di) 6= ∅ and
Φ−1(Dj) 6= ∅ it holds that t
′
i < tj. That is, the voters matched to the candidates from a
given clone set form a consecutive block within the voter order.
Now it is easy to modify our dynamic programming algorithm for profiles with bounded
single-crossing width. We guess an integer j ∈ [s], a subset D′j of Dj (the candidates from
Dj to join the assembly), and a voter vi 6= vn such that voters vi+1, . . . , vn are represented
by the candidates from D′j . Note that assigning the candidates from D
′
j to these voters
optimally is easy under Chamberlin–Courant’s rule: each voter gets her most preferred
candidate from D′j . An optimal representation for v1, . . . , vi is found recursively (for an
appropriately smaller assembly). To implement guessing, we try all possible choices of j, all
possible subsets of Dj , and all possible choices of vi, and we use dynamic programming to
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implement the recursive calls efficiently, just as in the perfectly single-crossing case. Since
there are only s2w|V | possibilities to consider at each guessing step and s ≤ |C|, we obtain
the desired bound on the running time. ✷
Naturally, for this result to be useful, we need an efficient algorithm that computes
single-crossing width of a profile and an appropriate division into clone sets. Fortunately,
such an algorithm is provided by Cornaz et al. [CGS13]. (Interestingly, a very similar
problem of finding a division into clones that results in a single-crossing election with as
many candidates as possible is NP-hard [EFS12]). As a consequence, we have the following
corollary (see the books [Nie06, DF99] for an introduction to fixed-parameter complexity
theory).
Corollary 10 For every family α of polynomial-time computable dissatisfaction functions
and for every ℓ ∈ {ℓ1, ℓ∞}, the problem of winner determination for α-ℓ-CC is fixed-
parameter tractable with respect to the single-crossing width of the input profile.
4 Monroe’s Rule
The results of Betzler et al. [BSU13] suggest that winner determination under Monroe’s rule
tends to be harder than winner determination under Chamberlin–Courant’s rule. In this
section, we show that this is also the case for single-crossing profiles: we prove that for the
utilitarian variant of Monroe’s rule with Borda dissatisfaction function (perhaps the most
natural variant of Monroe’s rule) computing winners is NP-hard, even for single-crossing
elections. We then complement this hardness result by showing that for the egalitarian
version of Monroe’s rule winner determination is easy if we additionally assume that the
preferences are narcissistic.
4.1 Hardness for General Single-Crossing Profiles
This section is devoted to proving that winner determination under Monroe’s rule is NP-
hard. The main idea of the proof is to reduce the problem of winner determination for
unrestricted profiles to the case of single-crossing profiles.
Theorem 11 Finding a set of winners under αB-ℓ1-Monroe voting rule is NP-hard, even
for single-crossing elections.
The proof of this theorem is somewhat involved. We first need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 12 Consider an election E = (C, V ) with C = {c1, . . . , cm}, V = (v1, . . . , vn). Let
A and B be two disjoint sets of candidates such that |A| = |B| = mn. For each ci ∈ C,
there is a single-crossing election AdjV (A, ci, B) with candidate set A ∪B ∪ {ci} and voter
list V ′ = (v′1, . . . , v
′
n) such that posv′j(ci) = mn+ posvj (ci) for each j ∈ [n], and the profile
(v′0, v
′
1, . . . , v
′
n, v
′
n+1), where v
′
0 has preference order a1 ≻ · · · ≻ a|A| ≻ ci ≻ b1 ≻ · · · ≻ b|B|
and v′n+1 has preference order b1 ≻ · · · ≻ b|B| ≻ ci ≻ a1 ≻ · · · ≻ a|A|, is also single-crossing.
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Proof Set A = {a1, . . . , amn} and B = {b1, . . . , bmn}. Fix a candidate ci ∈ C. We build
the election AdjV (A, ci, B) as follows. We set v
′
1’s preference order to be
a1 ≻ a2 ≻ . . . ≻ amn ≻ b1 ≻ b2 ≻ . . .
≻ bposv1(i)−1 ≻ ci ≻ bposv1(i) ≻ · · · ≻ bmn.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ n−1, we build the preference order of voter vj+1 based on the preference order
already constructed for vj. Given that the preference order of vj is of the form
a1 ≻ a2 ≻ . . . ≻ ax ≻ b1 ≻ b2 ≻ · · · ≻ by ≻ ci
≻ by+1 ≻ · · · ≻ bmn ≻ ax+1 ≻ · · · ≻ amn,
we construct the preference order of vj+1 either by moving some of the candidates from B
to precede ci or by moving some of the candidate from A to follow ci. Specifically, we do
the following. First, we compute d = posvj+1(i)− posvj (i); note that −m < d < m. If d ≥ 0
then we set vj+1’s preference order to be
a1 ≻ a2 ≻ . . . ≻ ax ≻ b1 ≻ b2 ≻ · · · ≻ by+d ≻ ci
≻ by+d+1 ≻ · · · ≻ bmn ≻ ax+1 ≻ · · · ≻ amn.
If d < 0 then we set vj+1’s preference order to be
a1 ≻ a2 ≻ . . . ≻ ax−d ≻ b1 ≻ b2 ≻ · · · ≻ by ≻ ci
≻ by+1 ≻ · · · ≻ bmn ≻ ax−d ≻ · · · ≻ amn.
If d = 0 then we set vj+1’s preference order to be the same as vj’s. Clearly, to construct
each vote it suffices to shift forward or backward a block of at most m candidates and since
both A and B contain mn candidates, doing so is always possible. Finally, it is clear that
we never change the relative order of the candidates within A and within B, and that the
resulting profile is single-crossing, even if we prepend v′0 and append v
′
n+1 to it. ✷
Lemma 13 For every pair of positive integers k, n such that k divides n, and every set
C = {c1, . . . , cm} of candidates, there is a single-crossing profile R(C) with (
n
k
+1)m voters
such that each candidate ci ∈ C is ranked first by exactly (
n
k
+ 1) voters.
Proof We build a list V = V1+ · · ·+Vm of voters, where each Vi, i ∈ [m], contains
n
k
+1
voters. The preference order of each voter in Vi is ci ≻ ci+1 ≻ · · · cm ≻ ci−1 ≻ · · · ≻ c2 ≻ c1.
It is clear that a thus-constructed profile is single-crossing. Note that the preference order
of the last voter in this profile is the reverse of the preference order of the first voter. ✷
We extend the notation introduced in Lemma 13 to apply to orders of candidates. That
is, if C→ is an order of candidates in C, then by R(C→) we denote the election that we
would construct in Lemma 13 if the first voter’s preference order was C→ (i.e., if we took c1
to be the top candidate according to C→, c2 to be the second one, and so on). By R
−1(C→)
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V1 :H R
−1(F1 . . . Fm E Em . . . E1) c1 . . . cm D1 . . . Dm G1 . . . Gm G
V2 :H R(R
−1(F1 . . . Fm E Em . . . E1)) c1 . . . cm D1 . . . Dm G1 . . . Gm G
v13 : H F1 · · ·Fm E Em . . . E2 c1 E1 c2 . . . cm D1 . . . Dm G1 . . . Gm G
v23 : H F1 · · ·Fm E D1 Em . . . E3 c2 E2 c3 . . . cm c1 E1 D2 . . . Dm G1 . . . Gm G
...
vm3 :H F1 · · ·Fm E D1 . . . Dm−1 cm Em cm−1 . . . c1 Em−1 . . . E1 Dm G1 . . . Gm G
V4 :H D1 . . . Dm Adj(F1, cm, G1) . . . Adj(Fm, c1, Gm) E Em . . . E1 G
V5 :H R(D1 . . . Dm G1 . . . Gm G) cm . . . c1 F1 . . . Fm E Em . . . E1
Table 1: The profile used in the proof of Theorem 11. For each voter list Vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, and
for each voter v in Vi we list the (sets of) candidates in the order of v’s preference (we omit
the “≻” symbol for readability). Whenever we list a set of candidates as a part of an order,
we assume that the candidates in this set are ordered in some fixed, easily-computable way
(for candidates in H we fix this order to be h1 ≻ · · · ≻ hm−k). Further, when in a line
describing a preference order of an entire collection of voters Vr = (v1, . . . , vs) (specifically,
for us r is either 2, 4, or 5, and s is the number of voters in this list of voters) we include
a profile V ′ = (v′1, . . . , v
′
s) (in our case V
′ is either an R-profile or an Adj-profile), then we
mean that for each voter vi, i ∈ [s], in Vr, this part of this voter’s preference order is the
preference order of v′i in V
′.
we denote an order C ′→ of the candidates in C such that R(C
′
→) produces an election where
the last voter has preference order C→. With these lemmas and notation available, we are
ready to give our proof of Theorem 11.
Proof of Theorem 11 Let I be an instance of the problem of finding k winners under
αB-ℓ1-Monroe rule, and let (C, V ) be the election considered in I. Set n = |V | and m = |C|.
We assume that n is divisible by k and that n > k (computing αB-ℓ1-Monroe winners is
still NP-hard under these assumptions [BSU13, SFS13b]). We will show how to construct
in polynomial time an instance Isc of the problem of finding winners under αB-ℓ1-Monroe
where the election is single-crossing so that it is easy to extract the set of winners for I
from the set of winners for Isc.
We construct Isc in the following way. First, we define the candidate set Csc to be the
union of the following disjoint sets (we provide names of the candidates only where relevant
and abbreviate
∑m
i=1 to
∑
i):
1. H = {h1, . . . , hm−k}, where |H| = m− k;
2. F1, . . . Fm, where |Fi| = mn for each i ∈ [m];
3. E1, . . . Em, where |Ei| = 2m
2n+m+ (m− i)(2mn + 1)n
k
for each i ∈ [m];
4. E, where |E| = m2n+m;
5. D1, . . . ,Dm, where |Di| = |Ei| for each i ∈ [m];
11
6. G1, . . . , Gm, where |Gi| = |Fi| = mn for each i ∈ [m];
7. G, where |G| = (
∑
i |Fi|+ |E|);
8. C ′ = C = {c1, . . . , cm}.
The ordered list Vsc of voters consists of the following five sublists (we only give names
to those voters to whom we will refer directly later; whenever sufficient, we only give the
number of voters in a given list):
1. V1, |V1| = |H|
n
k
= (m− k)n
k
;
2. V2, |V2| = (
∑
i |Fi|+
∑
i |Ei|+ |E|)(
n
k
+ 1);
3. V3 = (v
1
3 , . . . , v
m
3 ), |V3| = m;
4. V4, |V4| = n;
5. V5, |V5| = (
∑
i |Di|+
∑
i |Gi|+ |G|)(
n
k
+ 1).
We give the preferences of the voters in Table 1. In the thus-defined profile our goal is to
find a parliament of size ksc = |Csc|−(m−k). Consequently, each selected candidate should
be assigned to n
k
+ 1 voters.
We claim that optimal solutions Φsc for Isc satisfy the following conditions:
(i) Each candidate c ∈ F1 ∪ · · · ∪ Fm ∪ E ∪ Em ∪ · · · ∪ E1 is a winner and is assigned to
those voters from V1 + V2 that rank c in position |H|+1 = m− k+1 (note that only
one of these candidates can be assigned to (some of the) voters in V1).
(ii) Each candidate c ∈ D1 ∪ · · · ∪Dm ∪G1 ∪ · · · ∪Gm ∪G is a winner and is assigned to
those voters from V5 that rank c in position |H|+ 1 = m− k + 1.
(iii) Each candidate hi ∈ H is a winner and is assigned to
n
k
+ 1 voters from V1 + V2 + V3
(exactly |H| voters from V3 have some candidate from H assigned to them); each such
voter ranks hi in position i.
(iv) Exactly k candidates from C ′ are winners. Each of them is assigned to n
k
voters in V4
and to one voter in V3 that ranks him highest.
(v) The k winners from C ′ (let us call them w1, . . . , wk) are also αB-ℓ1-Monroe winners
in I and each of them is assigned in Isc to the voters corresponding to those from the
I-solution.
Let us now show that indeed the optimal solution is of this form. First, we make the
following observations:
(a) By a simple counting argument, at least k of the candidates from C ′ must be included
in the optimal solution.
(b) For each candidate hi in H, if hi is part of the optimal solution then hi is ranked in the
i-th position in the preference order of the voters to which hi is assigned (candidates
from H are always ranked first, in the order h1 ≻ · · · ≻ hm).
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(c) For each candidate c ∈ Csc \ (C
′ ∪ H), if c is included in the optimal solution then
each voter to which c is assigned ranks c in position m−k+1 or worse (this is because
every voter’s top m− k positions are taken by the candidates from H).
(d) Each voter in V1 + V2 + V5 ranks each candidate in C
′ position worse than
p1 = |H|+
∑
i
|Ei|+
∑
i
|Fi|+ |E| > |H|+
∑
i
|Ei|+ 2m
2n+m.
(e) Each voter in V4 ranks each candidate in C
′ in position better than
p2 = |H|+
∑
i
|Di|+
∑
i
|Fi|+
∑
i
|Gi|+m = |H|+
∑
i
|Ei|+ 2m
2n+m,
but worse than p3 = |H|+
∑
i |Ei|.
(f) p1 > p2.
(g) For each candidate c ∈ C ′, there is exactly one voter in V3 that ranks c in a position
no worse than
p4 = |H|+
∑
i
|Fi|+
∑
i<m
|Ei|+ |E| + 1
= |H|+
∑
i<m
|Ei|+ |E|+m
2n+ 1
< |H|+
∑
i
|Ei| = p3;
all other voters in V3 rank c in a position worse than
p5 = |H|+
∑
i
|Ei|+
∑
i
|Fi|+ |E| = |H|+
∑
i
|Ei|+ 2m
2n+m = p2.
Let Φ be an optimal assignment function among those that use exactly k candidates
from C ′. We claim that Φ satisfies conditions (i)–(iv). This is so, because assigning voters
from V4 to candidates other than those in C
′ will result in a strictly worse assignment (the
assignment would get worse for the candidates in C ′ because of points (d), (e), (f) and (g),
and it would not improve for the other candidates because of points (b) and (c)). Similarly,
each of the k selected candidates from C ′ should be assigned to exactly one voter from
V3—the one that ranks this candidate highest. Once we assign the k winners from C
′ to
the voters in V4 and to k voters in V3, the optimal way to complete the assignment is to do
so as described in conditions (i)–(iv).
Let Φ be an optimal assignment function for Isc that uses exactly k candidates from
C ′ and that satisfies conditions (i)–(iv). We now prove that it also satisfies condition (v).
Consider a candidate ci ∈ C
′ that is included in the set of winners under Φ. Let V ci4 be the
subcollection of the voters from V4 that are assigned to ci under Φ (naturally, |V
ci
4 | =
n
k
).
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Let V ci be the subcollection of V containing the voters corresponding to those in V ci4 (again,
|V ci | = n
k
). Let s(V ci4 ) be the dissatisfaction of the voters in V
ci
4 under Φ and let s(V
ci)
denote the dissatisfaction the voters in V ci would have if they were assigned to ci (in I).
The total dissatisfaction of the voters assigned to ci under Φ is:
(|H|+
∑
j |Ej |+
∑
j |Fj |+ |E| − |Ei|) + s(V
ci
4 ) =
(|H|+
∑
j |Ej |+
∑
j |Fj |+ |E| − 2m
2n−m− (m− i)(2mn + 1)n
k
)
+ n
k
(|H|+
∑
j |Dj |+ (m− i)(2mn + 1) +mn) + s(V
ci)) =
(n
k
+ 1)(|H| +
∑
j |Ej |+mn) + s(V
ci),
which shows that the dissatisfaction of the voters in Isc that are assigned to ci under Φ
differs from the dissatisfaction of the respective voters in I, had they been assigned to ci,
only by a value that depends on n, m, and k (but not on i). Thus condition (v) holds.
It remains to show that an optimal assignment function for Isc uses exactly k candidates
from C ′. Let Φsc be an optimal assignment function for Isc that satisfies conditions (i)–(v)
(and thus uses exactly k candidates from C ′). Let Φ′ be an assignment function for Isc that
uses more thank k candidates from C ′. We will show that the total dissatisfaction under Φ′
is higher than under Φsc. It is easy to see that the average dissatisfaction of the voters in
Φ−1sc (Csc \C
′) under Φsc is lower or equal than that of the voters in (Φ
′)−1(Csc \ C
′) under
Φ′ (this follows by contrasting properties (i)–(iii) and observations (b) and (c)).
By the same reasoning as in the proof of property (v), we note that for each candidate
ci ∈ C
′, the dissatisfaction of the voters that Φ′ assigns to ci can be lower bounded by the
dissatisfaction for the case where ci is assigned to the voter from V3 that ranks ci highest
and to n
k
voters from V4 that rank ci highest. The voter from V3 ranks ci in a position no
better than |H|+
∑
j |Ej |+
∑
j |Fj |+ |E|−|Ei| and each of the V4 voters ranks ci in position
no better than |H|+
∑
j |Dj |+(m− i)(2mn+1)+mn. Thus, under Φ
′, the dissatisfaction
of the voters to whom ci is assigned can be lower bounded by:
|H|+
∑
j |Ej |+
∑
j |Fj |+ |E| − |Ei|
+ n
k
(|H|+
∑
j |Dj |+ (m− i)(2mn + 1) +mn)
= |H|+
∑
j |Ej|+
∑
j |Fj |+ |E|
+ n
k
(|H|+
∑
j |Dj |+mn)− 2m
2n−m.
Similarly, if ci is selected under Φsc then the dissatisfaction of the voters to whom ci is
assigned under Φsc can be upper bounded as follows (the idea of the upper bound is similar
to the one for the lower bound above, except now we take the upper bound regarding the
position of ci in the preference orders of voters from V4):
|H|+
∑
j |Ej |+
∑
j |Fj |+ |E| − |Ei|
+ n
k
(|H|+
∑
j |Dj |+ (m− i)(2mn + 1) +mn+m)
= |H|+
∑
j |Ej |+
∑
j |Fj |+ |E|
+ n
k
(|H|+
∑
j |Dj |+mn+m)− 2m
2n−m.
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Note that neither of the bounds depends on i and that the difference between the upper
bound for Φsc and the lower bound for Φ
′ is mn
k
. Thus for each subset of k candidates from
C ′ that are assigned under Φ′, the total dissatisfaction these candidates impose is, at best,
better by an additive factor of mn than the dissatisfaction imposed by the k candidates
selected from C ′ under Φsc. However, under Φ
′ there are at least n
k
voters outside of V4
that are assigned to candidates in C ′. Each of these voters ranks the candidate assigned to
her in a position worse than p2 > 2m
2n +m. On the other hand, under Ci each of these
voters is assigned to some candidate that she ranks in a position no worse than m− k + 1.
Since n
k
(2m2n+m−m+ k − 1) > mn, it holds that Φsc(Vsc) < Φ
′(Vsc).
We conclude that an optimal assignment function Φsc assigns voters to exactly k can-
didates from C ′ and that the dissatisfaction of the voters in Isc under Φsc is equal to the
optimal dissatisfaction of the voters in I plus an easily computable value that depends on
m, n, and k only. This completes the proof. ✷
Betzler et al. [BSU13] have shown a similar hardness result for single-peaked elections;
however, their construction uses an artificial dissatisfaction function rather than Borda.
The complexity of winner determination under αB-ℓ1-Monroe for single-peaked elections
is still an open question. As our result answers this question in the case of single-crossing
elections, it is tempting to ask if our proof approach could be used for single-peaked elections.
Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case. The difficulty lies in jointly implementing
voters V3 + V4 (and, in particular, positioning the candidates c1, . . . , cm).
4.2 ℓ∞-Monroe for Single-Crossing Narcissistic Profiles
Given our hardness result for Monroe’s rule, it is natural to ask if we can further restrict
the problem of computing Monroe’s winners to obtain tractability. To this end, we focus on
the egalitarian version of Monroe’e rule (the results of Betzler et al. [BSU13] suggest that
it is likely to be more tractable than the utilitarian version of this rule), and consider an
additional domain restriction, namely, narcissistic preferences.
An election is said to be narcissistic if every candidate is ranked first by at least one
voter. Intuitively, such elections arise when candidates are allowed to vote for themselves.
This notion was introduced by Bartholdi and Trick [BT86], and was used in the context of
fully proportional representation by Cornaz et al. [CGS12]. It turns out that it is useful
in our setting, too: we will show that the egalitarian version of Monroe’s rule admits an
efficient winner determination algorithm under single-crossing narcissistic preferences.
Lemma 14 Let E = (C, V ) be a single-crossing narcissistic election with C = {c1, . . . , cm},
V = (v1, . . . , vn), where v1 has preference order c1 ≻ · · · ≻ cm. For every k ∈ [m] and every
dissatisfaction function α for m candidates, there is an optimal k-Monroe assignment Φ for
E under α-ℓ∞-Monroe such that for each candidate ci ∈ C, if Φ
−1(ci) 6= ∅ then there are
two integers, ti and t
′
i, ti ≤ t
′
i, such that Φ
−1(ci) = {vti , vti+1, . . . , vt′i}. Moreover, for each
i < j such that Φ−1(ci) 6= ∅ and Φ
−1(cj) 6= ∅ it holds that t
′
i < tj.
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Proof Suppose that we seek a parliament of size k. Let α be some dissatisfaction function,
let Φ be an optimal k-Monroe-assignment function for E under α-ℓ∞-Monroe, and let t be
the smallest value such that under Φ each voter is assigned to a candidate that this voter
ranks in position t or higher. We will now show how to transform Φ into the form required
in the statement of the lemma.
Let s = max{s′ | there is vi such that Φ(vi) = cs′}; that is, let cs be the last candidate
in v1’s preference order that is assigned to some voters. Let ns be the number of voters to
whom cs is assigned. We claim that there is a k-Monroe-assignment function Φ
′′ with the
same egalitarian utility as that of Φ that assigns cs to the voters vn−ns+1, . . . , vn.
If Φ itself satisfies this requirement, we are done. Otherwise, we transform it as follows.
Pick the smallest i such that Φ(vi) = cs. There must be some voter vj , j > i, such that
Φ(vj) 6= cs (otherwise Φ would have satisfied our requirement). Let cr = Φ(vj). We set
Φ′(vℓ) =


Φ(vℓ) if ℓ 6= i, j
cr if ℓ = i
cs if ℓ = j.
Clearly. Φ′ is a k-Monroe-assignment function for E and we now show that ℓ∞(Φ
′) ≤ ℓ∞(Φ).
We consider the following two cases.
vi prefers cs to cr. Since v1 prefers cr to cs and we assume that vi prefers cs to cr, it
must be the case that vj also prefers cs to cr. Further, since E is narcissistic, there is a
voter vℓ, ℓ < i, who ranks cr first. This means that vi ranks cr at least as highly as vj
does. Indeed, otherwise there would be a candidate c such that vi prefers c to cr and
vj prefers cr to c; this is impossible since vℓ prefers cr to c and E is single-crossing.
This means that ℓ∞(Φ
′) ≤ ℓ∞(Φ).
vi prefers cr to cs. This means that assigning cr to vi does not increase the dissatisfaction
induced by the assignment. We have to show that assigning cs to vj does not increase
it either. If vj prefers cs to cr, then we are done. Thus, we can assume that vj prefers
cr to cs. Since V is narcissistic, there is a vote vq with q > j where cs is ranked
first. This means that vj ranks cs at least as highly as vi does. Indeed, otherwise
there would be some candidate c such that vi prefers cs to c, vj prefers c to cs, and vq
prefers cs to c; this is impossible, since E is single-crossing. Thus ℓ∞(Φ
′) ≤ ℓ∞(Φ).
This proves that Φ′ is a k-Monroe assignment with egalitarian dissatisfaction no worse
than that of Φ. By repeating the same reasoning sufficiently many times, we eventually
reach an assignment function Φ′′ where cs is assigned exactly to the voters vn−ns+1, . . . , vn:
each iteration gets us closer to this goal. We then continue in the same way to handle
the rest of the elected candidates. That is, we set s(2) = max{s′ | there is vi such that
Φ′′(vi) = cs′ and s
′ < s}, we set ns(2) to be the number of voters to which Φ
′′ assigns
cs(2) , and transform Φ
′′ to be a k-Monroe-assignment function that assigns cs(2) to voters
vn−ns−n
s(2)
+1, . . . , vn−ns , and cs to voters vn−ns+1, . . . , vn. We repeat in the same manner
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until we reach a k-Monroe-assignment function that satisfies the statement of the lemma.
✷
Based on Lemma 14, it is easy to construct a dynamic programming algorithm for
ℓ∞-Monroe.
Theorem 15 For every family α of polynomial-time computable dissatisfaction functions,
there is a polynomial-time algorithm that given a single-crossing narcissistic election E and
a positive integer k finds an optimal k-Monroe assignment for E under α-ℓ∞-Monroe.
Proof Let E = (C, V ) be a single-crossing narcissistic election, let α be our dissatisfaction
function, and let k be the size of the parliament that we seek. We assume that C =
{c1, . . . , cm}, V = (v1, . . . , vn), and that v1’s preference order is c1 ≻ · · · ≻ cm. Based on
Lemma 14, we give a dynamic programming algorithm for α-ℓ∞-Monroe.
For each i, j, t, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ m, 0 ≤ t ≤ k, we define A[i, j, t] to be the
lowest dissatisfaction that one can achieve by assigning to the voters v1, . . . , vi exactly t
candidates from the set Cj = {c1, . . . , cj} in such a way that each candidate is assigned
to either ⌈n
k
⌉ consecutive voters or to ⌊n
k
⌋ consecutive voters; we set A[i, j, t] = ∞ if such
an assignment does not exist. In particular, for each j we have A[0, j, 0] = 0 and we can
compute in time O(1) the value A[i, j, t] whenever at least one of the arguments is 0. We
also adopt the convention that A[i, j, t] = ∞ whenever at least one of the arguments is
negative. Further, for every pair of integers i, i′ with i ≤ i′ and every candidate cj , we
define pos(i, i′, cj) to be the worst position of candidate cj in the votes that belong to the
set {vt | max{1, i} ≤ t ≤ min{n, i
′}}.
It is easy to see that the following equality holds for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], t ∈ [k] (we take
the minimum over an empty set to be ∞):
A[i, j, t] = min
j′≤j
{
min
{
max
{
α(pos(i−
⌊n
k
⌋
+ 1, i, cj′)), A[i −
⌊n
k
⌋
, j′ − 1, t− 1]
}
,
max
{
α(pos(i−
⌈n
k
⌉
+ 1, i, cj′)), A[i −
⌈n
k
⌉
, j′ − 1, t− 1]
}}}
.
Using this equality and standard dynamic programming, it is easy to compute A[n,m, k]
and the k-Monroe-assignment function that achieves this dissatisfaction in polynomial time.
To be more precise, computing A[n,m, k] requires time O(nm2k); to achieve this running
time, we first compute all the necessary values pos(i−
⌊
n
k
⌋
+1, i, cj) and pos(i−
⌈
n
k
⌉
+1, i, cj)
in time O(nm). If k divides n, the running time can be improved to O(nm2) because we
can omit the parameter t in A[i, j, t]. Optimality of the computed assignment follows by
Lemma 14. ✷
In a way, Theorem 15 is not new: It can be shown that narcissistic elections are nec-
essarily single-peaked (this is implicit in the work of Barbera` and Moreno [BM11]), and
for single-peaked elections Betzler et al [BSU13] provide a polynomial-time algorithm for
ℓ∞-Monroe (Proposition 5 in [BSU13]). Thus, if we only care about polynomial-time com-
putability, Theorem 15 does not appear to be useful. However, there are two reasons to
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prefer the algorithm described in Theorem 15. First, our algorithm is considerably faster:
the running time of Betzler et al.’s algorithm is O(n3m3k3), while for our algorithm it is
O(nm2k). Second, our algorithm produces an assignment that has the contiguous blocks
property. In contrast, in Section 5 we show that this is not necessarily the case for the
algorithm of Betzler et al.
5 Contiguous Blocks Property: Counterexamples
We will now explore the limitations of the algorithmic approach that is based on the con-
tiguous blocks property.
First, we provide an example of a single-crossing election such that all optimal assign-
ments under Monroe’s rule do not possess the contiguous blocks property; in fact, the
approximation ratio of every algorithm that produces assignments with this property is
Ω(m). This result holds both for the utilitarian and for the egalitarian version of Monroe’s
rule.
Example 16 Let C = {c1, c2} ∪ A ∪ B be a set of candidates, where |A| = |B| = m. Let
V = V1 + V2 + V3 + V4 be a list of voters, where each Vi contains n voters. Voters in each
Vi have identical preference orders, defined as follows.
V1 : c1 ≻ B→ ≻ c2 ≻ A→,
V2 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ B← ≻ A→,
V3 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ A→ ≻ B←,
V4 : c1 ≻ A← ≻ c2 ≻ B←.
We seek a 2-member parliament, and use Borda misrepresentation function αB.
If we partition voters into contiguous blocks, then the best we can do is to assign c1 to
V1 + V2 and c2 to V3 + V4 (or the other way round), achieving dissatisfaction of n(m+ 2)
and m + 1 under αB-ℓ1-Monroe and αB-ℓ∞-Monroe, respectively. In contrast, if we assign
c1 to V1 + V4 and c2 to V2 + V3, then the total dissatisfaction under αB-ℓ1-Monroe and
αB-ℓ∞-Monroe is 2n and 1, respectively.
Further, even for narcissistic single-crossing elections, if we consider the utilitarian ver-
sion of Monroe’s rule, imposing the contiguous blocks property may lead to suboptimal
solutions.
Example 17 We consider the set C = {a, b, c, d, e, f} of candidates and the following twelve
voters (the profile is clearly narcissistic and it is easy to check that it is single-crossing):
v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ f,
v2 : b ≻ a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ f,
v3 : b ≻ c ≻ a ≻ d ≻ e ≻ f,
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v4 : c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ d ≻ e ≻ f,
v5 : c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ d ≻ e ≻ f,
v6 : c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ d ≻ e ≻ f,
v7 : c ≻ b ≻ d ≻ a ≻ e ≻ f,
v8 : c ≻ d ≻ b ≻ a ≻ e ≻ f,
v9 : d ≻ e ≻ f ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a,
v10 : e ≻ f ≻ d ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a,
v11 : e ≻ f ≻ d ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a,
v12 : f ≻ e ≻ d ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a.
We seek a 2-member parliament, and our voting rule is αB-ℓ1-Monroe. If we require the
assignment function to have the contiguous blocks property, then the unique optimal solu-
tion assigns b to each voter in V1 = (v1, . . . , v6) and d to each voter in V2 = (v7, . . . , v12).
Under this assignment the total misrepresentation of the voters in V1 and V2 is given by
4 and 9, respectively, so the optimal total misrepresentation for assignments with the con-
tiguous blocks property is 13.
On the other hand, without the contiguous blocks property, we can assign candidate e
to voters v1, v2, v9, v10, v11, v12, and candidate c to voters v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8, for the total
misrepresentation of 11. Indeed, we will now argue that this is the unique optimal solution.
For each candidate x, set lowest(x) = min
{∑
i∈I αB(posvi(x)) | I ⊆ [12], |I| = 6
}
. Intu-
itively, lowest(x) corresponds to assigning x in the best possible way. We have
lowest(a) = 9, lowest(b) = 4, lowest(c) = 1
lowest(d) = 9, lowest(e) = 10, lowest(f) = 14.
Thus each assignment function that gives total misrepresentation of at most 11 produces
one of the following sets of winners: {a, c}, {b, c}, {c, d}, or {c, e}.
Now, if the set of winners is {a, c} or {b, c}, the total misprepresentation is at least 12,
because for each voter in (v9, v10, v11, v12) assigning a candidate from either of these sets
results in a misrepresentation of at least 3.
Consider the candidates c and d. If each voter were assigned to her more preferred
candidate among these two, we would get a 2-CC-assignment function with misrepresen-
tation 11. However, under this assignment 8 voters are assigned to c, so the best Monroe
assignment for these two candidates has misrepresentation at least 12. Finally, it is clear
that no assignment function that uses c and e can have a lower misrepresentation than 11
and we have seen that such a 2-Monroe assignment exists.
To summarize, imposing the contiguous blocks property may lead to a suboptimal assign-
ment whose set of winners is disjoint from the one for the optimal assignment, even in a
narcissistic single-crossing election.
We now consider single-peaked preferences. Note that the definition of a single-peaked
election does not impose any restrictions on the voter ordering, and therefore it is not
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immediately clear what is the correct way to extend the contiguous blocks property to this
setting. However, it seems natural to order the voters according to their most preferred
candidates (using the candidate order given by the axis), breaking ties according to their
second most preferred candidate, etc. That is, consider an election E = (C, V ) that is
single-peaked with respect to the order c1 ✁ · · · ✁ cm. A voter with a preference order
ci1 ≻ · · · ≻ cim can be identified with the string i1 . . . im. We reorder the voters so that if
i < j then the string associated with vi is lexicographically smaller than or equal to the
string associated with vj .
We then ask if for every single-peaked election there exists an optimal assignment for
Chamberlin–Courant’s rule or Monroe’s rule that satisfies the contiguous blocks property
with respect to this ordering. We will now show that the answer is “no”, both for the
egalitarian and the utilitarian version of both rules. Indeed, just as in Example 16, imposing
the contiguous blocks property has a cost of Ω(m).
Example 18 Let C = {x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ym, a, b, c, d}. Let V = (v1, v2, v3, v4), where
v1 : a ≻ x1 ≻ · · · ≻ xm ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ y1 ≻ · · · ≻ ym,
v2 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ y1 ≻ · · · ≻ ym ≻ a ≻ x1 ≻ · · · ≻ xm,
v3 : c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ x1 ≻ · · · ≻ xm ≻ d ≻ y1 ≻ · · · ≻ ym,
v4 : d ≻ y1 ≻ · · · ≻ ym ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ x1 ≻ · · · ≻ xm.
It is easy to see that E = (C, V ) is single-peaked with respect to the axis
xm ≻ · · · ≻ x1 ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ y1 ≻ · · · ≻ ym.
In fact, it can be shown that all axes witnessing that E is single-peaked have the property
that a, b, c, and d appear in the center of the axis, ordered as a > b > c > d or d > c > b > a
(this is implied, e.g., by the analysis in [ELO¨08]). Thus the ordering of the voters induced by
the axis is (v1, v2, v3, v4). We seek a 2-member parliament, and use Borda misrepresentation
function αB.
Suppose that we assign a to v1 and v3 and d to v2 and v4. Then the total dissatisfaction
under αB-ℓ1-Monroe and αB-ℓ∞-Monroe is 4 and 2, respectively. However, if we impose
the contiguous blocks property, then the optimal assignment for Monroe’s is to assign b to
v1 and v2, and c to v3 and v4; this results in total dissatisfaction of 2(m + 1) and m + 1
with respect to αB-ℓ1-Monroe and αB-ℓ∞-Monroe, respectively. For αB-ℓ1-CC, we can
obtain a somewhat better dissatisfaction than for αB-ℓ1-Monroe, by assigning b to v1, v2,
and v3, and assigning d to v4. However, even for Chamberlin–Courant’s rule under every
assignment that has the contiguous blocks property, at least one voter will be assigned to a
candidate that she ranks in position m+2 or lower, so the total (egalitarian or utilitarian)
dissatisfaction will be at least m+ 1.
Example 18 illustrates that our algorithms for Chamberlin–Courant’s rule (for single-
crossing elections) and for the egalitarian version of Monroe’s rule (for single-crossing nar-
cissistic elections) are quite different from the algorithms for these problems proposed by
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Betzler et al. [BSU13] for single-peaked elections: even though all of these algorithms rely
on dynamic programming, the dynamic program for single-peaked elections is very different
from the one for single-crossing elections. As a consequence, if we apply Betzler et al.’s
algorithm to a single-crossing narcissistic election, we may fail to get an assignment that
satisfies the contiguous blocks property. Examples 16 and 17 further show that we cannot
hope to extend Theorem 15 to all single-crossing elections, or to utilitarian preferences.
6 Conclusions
We have considered the complexity of winner determination under Chamberlin–Courant’s
and Monroe’s rules, for the case of single-crossing profiles. We have presented a polynomial-
time algorithm for Chamberlin–Courant’s rule for single-crossing elections (and for elections
that are close to being single-crossing in the sense of having bounded single-crossing width),
and an NP-hardness proof for Monroe’s rule for the same setting. Our results further
strengthen the intuition that Monroe’s rule is algorithmically harder than Chamberlin–
Courant’s rule. Similar conclusions follow from the work of Betzler et al. [BSU13] and
Skowron et al. [SFS13b]
Inspired by our negative result for Monroe’s rule, we have sought further natural restric-
tions on voters’ preferences. To this end, we considered single-crossing narcissistic profiles
and developed an efficient algorithm for the egalitarian version of Monroe’s rule under this
preference restriction. However, we showed that our approach does not extend to general
single-crossing elections, or to the utilitarian version of Monroe’s rule.
Perhaps the most obvious direction for future research that is suggested by our work is
understanding the computational complexity of the utilitarian version of Monroe’s rule for
single-crossing narcissistic elections and of egalitarian version of Monroe’s rule for single-
crossing profiles. While we have shown that approaches based on the contiguous blocks
property are bound to fail, other approaches may be more successful. Going in another
direction, perhaps it is possible to obtain efficient algorithms for our restricted domains and
for dissatisfaction functions other than Borda.
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